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John C. Eastmanf
Introduction
The theme of the Symposium at which this Article was presented was Immigration Law and Institutional Design. Our mission, as Symposium participants, was to assess the efficacy of
the institutions that adopt and enforce our immigration laws.
But before we can possibly make an efficacy assessment, we
must address a normative question, namely, just what is it that
our immigration laws seek to accomplish? It seems to me that
there are three mutually exclusive alternatives or, perhaps more
accurately, three principal points on a continuum of policy alternatives: (1) open borders, with unconstrained immigration and
naturalization; (2) closed borders, with no permanent immigration and naturalization, only temporary visas for students, tourists, and so forth; and (3) controlled borders, with limited immiaccording to some established
gration and naturalization
standard.
In our nation's historical narrative, the first is best exemplified by the iconic words from the famous poem by Emma Lazarus, penned to help raise funds for the construction of the Statue
of Liberty's pedestal in the 1880s: "Give me your tired, your
poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free."1 These
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words are widely believed to reflect the purpose of the Statue of
Liberty, beckoning to the world an open borders US immigration
policy. And they harken back to the very first days of the Republic, when Thomas Paine called America "the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of
Europe."2
On the other end of the continuum are the various nativist
movements that have held sway at various points in our nation's
history, which have sought to severely curtail or even eliminate
altogether immigration to the United States. Oftentimes tinged
with racism or religious or ethnic bigotry, these movements have
been most vibrant in reaction to large waves of immigration to
the United States, particularly when combined with economic
recessions or depressions. The American Party (or KnowNothings) of the 1850s, with its opposition to Catholic immigrants from Ireland and Germany;3 the Workingmen's Party of
California and the Supreme Order of Caucasians, with their opposition to Chinese immigrants and successful advocacy for the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882;4 the Immigration Restriction
League of the 1890s,5 with its opposition to the influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe; and the second Ku
Klux Klan of the 1920s and 1930s, with its opposition to Catholic
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and Jewish immigrants,6 primarily from southern and eastern
Europe, are just a few.
In between is the controlled borders policy reflected by current federal immigration law - that is, the law on the books, not
necessarily the law as it is enforced. And, truth be told, this is
the policy reflected by the original Statue of Liberty story. The
version of that story described above is actually anachronistic,
driven more by Lazarus's poem and the chance location of the
Statue near the immigrant processing center that opened on Ellis Island in 1892 than by the Statue's original purpose. Contrary to popular belief, the words are not engraved on the tablet
Lady Liberty holds in her left arm - the inscription there is "July 4, 1776" - but are engraved on a bronze plaque that was affixed to the base of the Statue in 1903 (now housed inside the
museum), thirty years after the Statue was built and seventeen
years after it was dedicated.7
Instead, the Statue was intended to commemorate the success of the American Revolution and the vindication of the Revolution's ideals in the then-recently ended Civil War. It was originally supposed to be dedicated in 1876 to mark the centennial
of the Declaration of Independence. It was a gift from the people
of France, who had helped make military success in the American Revolution possible, but Edouard de Laboulaye, who proposed the Statue, also hoped that the Statue would inspire the
French people to revive their own democracy in the face of what
had again become a repressive monarchy. The famous torch that
Lady Liberty holds above her head, like the Statue's original
name, "Liberty Enlightening the World," was not so much a beacon lighting the way for immigrants but rather a reflection of
the shining "city on a hill"8 metaphor of America as an enlightened example of how to organize governmental institutions

6 See RoryMcVeigh,
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elsewhere in the world to secure the blessings of liberty for other
nations' own peoples.9
Nevertheless, these two dramatically different views of the
Statue of Liberty story are playing out today in our national debate over immigration policy. Many who hold the "give me your
tired, your poor, your huddled masses" open borders position reject the very idea of borders as a throwback to a nation-state
mentality that developed as Europe was emerging from the
Dark Ages. For them, the developing norms of human rights
should guarantee to every human being unfettered access to territory and resources anywhere on the globe.10 Why should anyone have access to a better life merely because of the chance circumstance of the location of their birth? This pseudo-Rawlsian
view11 has been explicitly advanced in the immigration debate in
such recent works as The Birthright Lottery by Professor Ayelet
Shachar.12
Those of both the controlled borders and closed borders positions adhere to the view that national sovereignty still matters.
For them, the idea that "peoples" form governments in order to
best secure the inalienable rights of their own members, so eloquently described in our Declaration of Independence, still prevails. Accordingly, just how much immigration to permit at any
given time, and even from where, is a policy judgment that must
be made by the nation's sovereign authority, wherever that authority is vested. For the closed borders crowd, that policy judgment must yield a ban on further immigration. For the controlled borders advocates, some level of immigration is not only
permissible but cherished, though the precise level and the
terms may vary from generation to generation (or even from
year to year), depending on the circumstances.

9 See JohnBodnar,et al, TheChanging
Face oftheStatueofLiberty,
*5-6 (unDec 2005),onlineat http://www.cesu.umn.edu/
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From this brief descriptive introduction, the following institutional questions arise. Which institution will make the basic
policy judgment as to where on the continuum immigration policy will be placed at any given time? And which institution or institutions will best give effect to that policy judgment? Confusion about the answers to those questions, and the overlap
between them, lies at the heart of much of the current controversy over immigration policy.
I. Who Decides:

International

Law or Nation-State?

There seem to be two principal alternative answers to the
first question, which institution decides what immigration policy
will be: (1) an international law body or (2) the sovereign authority of the nation. While the former could presumably establish
something less than an open borders policy as the norm, the fact
that, absent explicit treaty agreements by member nations
(which would mean that the decision is really being authorized
by the sovereign authority of those nations), the authority of
such a body to act at all necessarily requires the recognition that
there is a fundamental human right not just to emigrate (that is,
leave one's country) but to immigrate (that is, enter into another
country, without regard for the wishes of the existing occupants
of that country).13 This would, of course, yield an open borders
rule.
There have been some moves in that direction recently. The
recent Argentinean law, described by University of Texas clinical law professor Barbara Hines in her article, The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration
Law, is one such example.14 But as Professor Hines herself correctly recognizes, the "principle [ ] is not found in the immigration
laws of any other large immigrant-receiving country nor explicitly
13 Although
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it byrenouncing
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in any international human rights conventions."15 And for this,
she cites a slew of authority, from the European Union's policy
statement on immigration;16to statutory law in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan;17 to various international treaties
and conventions.18 Most particularly, Professor Hines recognizes
that the "international human right to immigrate" principle is
not and has not been the rule in the United States.19 As the Supreme Court recognized long ago, "The right of a nation to expel
or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken
any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon
the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the
right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country."20
Whether the new Argentinean model ought to be the rule,
therefore, it clearly is not the rule in the overwhelming number
of jurisdictions, or in international law more broadly, or in the
United States specifically. Rather, the principle set out in the
US Declaration of Independence remains the almost universal
international norm. "Peoples" form governments, "laying [their]
foundation on such principles and organizing [their] powers in
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."21 It seems, then, that sovereignty still matters and that the sovereign authority of each nation may still define the terms upon which peoples from other parts of the globe
may become part of its body politic.

15 Hines,43 Cornell
IntlL Jat 472(citedinnote10).
16 EuropeanCommission,
Communication
to theEuropean
fromtheCommission
theCouncil,
theEuropean
Economic
andSocialCommittee
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States?

That the sovereign authority of a nation can set immigration policy as it sees fit does not answer the question of where
that authority resides in any particular nation, of course. In
some, a hereditary monarch or despot under some claim of divine right or just raw power may exercise the sovereign authority and unilaterally determine immigration policy for the nation.
In republican forms of government such as that of the United
States, however, the ultimate sovereign authority rests with the
people.
Control over immigration and naturalization policy in the
United States was, under the Articles of Confederation, originally left with the states. Article IV of the Articles merely required
that each state afford to the free residents of other states the
rights of ingress and egress and the basic privileges and immunities that it afforded to its own residents, leaving to each state
the power to set its own immigration and naturalization policies
beyond that. Unsurprisingly, that system proved unworkable.
Not only did this result in widely varying practices - a problem
that James Madison in Federalist 42 called a "defect" of the Articles22- but the mandate that each State afford free ingress to
the people of the other states meant, ultimately, that the state
with the most permissive naturalization policy would set the
rule for every other state. Accordingly, ever since 1789, the power over naturalization has, by constitutional design, been vested
in the national government.
More precisely, the power is vested in Congress. Article I,
Section 8, clause 4 expressly gives to Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." For a short period
under the new Constitution, there continued to be some dispute
about whether the constitutional provision vested exclusive authority over naturalization in Congress. Alexander Hamilton, in
Federalist 32, was of the view that the power was necessarily
exclusive, or else there would not be a "uniform" rule.23 But even
after Congress adopted its first "uniform Rule of Naturalization"
statute in 1790, 24some states continued to naturalize citizens on

22 Federalist
in TheFederalist
42 (Madison),
1961)(Jacob
279,286-87(Wesleyan
E. Cooke,
ed).
23 Federalist
in TheFederalist
32 (Hamilton),
199,201(citedinnote22).
24 Naturalization
Actof1790,ch3,1 Stat103.
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their own. That changed in 1795, when Congress added the
phrase, "and not otherwise," to the federal immigration statute.25
It should be emphasized that the power is vested specifically
in Congress, not in the federal government more broadly. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the Constitution assigns "plenary power over immigration policy to Congress,26 not
to the president or to the courts. The power to exclude foreigners
is an incident of sovereignty delegated by the Constitution to
"the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department."2,7Indeed, the Court declared more than
a century ago that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission
of aliens.28 "[T]hat the formulation of [immigration] policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government."29
Congress can therefore impose restrictions on immigration
and make it unlawful to immigrate to this country in violation of
those restrictions. But by constitutional design, Congress cannot
exercise the full measure of its plenary power over immigration
alone. It is lawmaker, but not prosecutor, judge, or jury. In our
constitutional system of checks and balances, the executive and
judicial departments both have a role to play. And in our complex system of federalism, the states may have a role to play as
well, even after the Constitution displaced the Articles of Confederation. Ascertaining the boundaries of those various institutional roles is the source of much of the recent controversy over
immigration policy and enforcement in recent decades.
III. The Federalism

Gloss

Let me take up the federalism issue first. There is no question that, in exercising its plenary power over immigration,
Congress can preempt state laws to the contrary.30A state cannot authorize immigration into its territory by someone whom
25 Naturalization
Actof1795,ch20,1 Stat414.
26 See,forexample,
Kleindienst
vMandel
, 408US 753,766(1972).
27 ChaeChanPingv United
States,130US 581,603(1889)(emphasis
added).
28 OceanicSteamNavigation
Co v Stranahan,
214 US 320,339 (1909)(emphasis
added).See alsoFiallovBell,430US 787,792(1977).
29 GalvanvPress,347US 522,531(1954)(emphasis
added).
30 See US ConstArtVI,cl 2 ("[T]heLawsoftheUnitedStates. . . shallbe thesuorLawsofanyStatetothe
premeLaw oftheLand. . . anyThingin theConstitution
Contrary
notwithstanding.").
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Congress has barred from admission to the United States, nor
can a state bar someone whom Congress has authorized. But
that basic, and uncontested, proposition does not solve two related issues. First, does the mere delegation to Congress of plenary power over naturalization preempt state laws, even before
Congress has exercised that power? In other words, is there a
sort of dormant Naturalization Clause limitation on states,
comparable to the dormant Commerce Clause limitation?31 Second, to what extent does Congress's Naturalization Clause power, whether exercised or dormant, impliedly preempt the states
from exercising powers reserved to them, such as the police
power, that though not a naturalization power itself nevertheless might touch on immigration? Or, phrased differently,just
how broad is implied field preemption or "obstacle" preemption
in the immigration context?32
A.

Is There a Dormant Naturalization

Clause?

The first issue, is there a dormant Naturalization Clause,
was presented to the courts in Hines v Davidowitz.33 At issue in
that case was an alien registration law passed by Pennsylvania
in 1939, which required all aliens over the age of eighteen to register annually with the state, pay a one-dollar annual registration fee, and carry their registration card with them at all
times.34 A three-judge district court enjoined the law as unconstitutional, holding that the law denied aliens the equal protection of the laws and encroached upon legislative powers constitutionally vested in the federal government, essentially adopting
a dormant Naturalization Clause theory because Congress had
not yet legislated on the subject.35 But before the Supreme Court
could hear the state's appeal, Congress adopted its own alien
registration act, requiring that all aliens over the age of fourteen
register a single time (rather than annually) with federal immigration officials.36 In addition to requiring less-frequent filing,
the federal law did not require aliens to carry a registration
31 See Willson
v BlackBirdCreekMarshCo,27 US (2 Pet)245,252(1829);C&A
NewYork
Inev TownofClarkstown,
, 511US 383,401-02(1994).
Carbone,
32 See Rice v Santa Fe ElevatorCorp, 331 US 218, 236 (1947);Caleb Nelson,
86Va L Rev225,227(2000).
Preemption,
33 312US 52 (1941).
34 Id at 59.
35 Id at 60.
36 Id.
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card, and only willful failure (as opposed to Pennsylvania's any
failure) to register was made a criminal offense.37Federal penalties, however, were more stringent. Violation of the federal statute was punishable by a fine of up to one thousand dollars, imprisonment of not more than six months, or both, while violation
of the Pennsylvania law was punishable by a fine of up to one
hundred dollars, sixty days in jail, or both.38
Although those challenging the Pennsylvania law argued
that the law was unconstitutional even before adoption of the
federal law, the Supreme Court declined to rule on those claims,
"expressly leaving open . . . the argument that the federal power
in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive."39
Instead, the Supreme Court held that
When the national government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges,
obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to or
take from the force and effectof such treaty or statute.40
There is language in the opinion suggesting that the Court
might be open to a dormant Naturalization Clause analysis at
some point. It explained the importance of leaving federal power
in fields affecting foreign affairs "entirely free from local interference," for example, lest the actions of one State create international repercussions that affect the entire nation.41 But the actual holding of the Court was more limited:
[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of
regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.42
The question left open in Hines has never been fully answered,
and given the expansive coverage of current federal immigration

37
38
39
40
41
42

Hines,312US at 60-61.
Id at 59-61.
Id at 62.
Id at 62-63(emphasis
added).
Hines, 312US at 63-64.
Id at 66-67(emphasis
added).
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law,43 it may never need to be answered. To be sure, the Supreme
Court in De Canas v Bica,44 decided thirty-fiveyears after Hines,
upheld the exercise of state police power in areas that touch on
immigration, thereby rejecting a strong version of a dormant Naturalization Clause theory that would bar the states from exercising
non-naturalization powers in ways that might have some impact
on naturalization policy.45But that presents a somewhat different
issue, taken up below. In the unlikely event that Congress
should repeal the existing statutory scheme, whether the states
could actually exercise a naturalization power, as some did in
the early years after the Constitution's adoption, apparently remains an open question.
B.

Is There Implied Preemption of States' Non-naturalization
Powers?

Even if there is a dormant Naturalization Clause that restricts states from exercising naturalization powers in the absence of Congressional action, that does not definitively resolve
the related but distinct question of whether the states can exercise other powers that might overlap or touch on the objects of
the naturalization power. The Constitution itself recognizes such
a distinction in the analogous context of import taxes. The states
are barred from levying import and export taxes "except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing [their] inspection
Laws."46 In other words, the power to tax imports and exports
has been delegated exclusively to Congress, but the States can,
in the exercise of their separate police powers to protect the
health of their citizens, impose such a tax.
Something similar is at work when the States exercise their
police powers in ways that touch on immigration, but that do not
actually amount to an exercise of a naturalization power. This is
the key point of the holding in De Canas , in which the Supreme
Court recognized that the states are not without authority to exercise core state police powers even in matters that touch federal
immigration policy. De Canas presented a challenge to a state
statute prohibiting employers from knowingly employing unlawful aliens on the ground that it amounted to state regulation of

«
44
«
«

INA§ 103(a)(5).
8 USC § 1103(a)(5),
See,forexample,
424US 351(1976).
Id at 365.
US ConstArtI, § 10,cl 2.
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immigration and thus was preempted by federal law.47 The
Court held that federal immigration law did not prevent the
states from regulating the employment of illegal aliens because
states possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate employment and protect workers within the state.48 "[T]he
fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render
it a regulation of immigration,"49 held the Court, thus apparently
rejecting at least part of the challenge left unaddressed in Hines,
namely, whether "the federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive."50
That principle was applied in Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v Whiting,61in which the Supreme Court upheld
the Legal Arizona Workers Act52 against challenges based on
federal immigration law preemption.53 The Court held that the
state law, which penalized employers of illegal aliens by withdrawing permission to do business in the state, a penalty much
harsher than the fines imposed under federal immigration law,
was not expressly preempted by federal law.54 On the contrary,
the federal statute's preemption clause had an explicit exemption for state licensing laws, and the Court rejected the argument that the exemption should be read narrowly, in part because the state was operating in an area of traditional state
concern.55 More pertinent for present purposes, though, the
Court also held that the state law was not implicitly preempted.56 The Supreme Court has become increasingly suspicious of
implied preemption claims in general, and that trend was manifested in the immigration context in Whiting: "Implied preemption analysis does not justify a freewheeling judicial inquiry into
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives;
such an endeavor would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law."57 A slight
detour into preemption doctrine is therefore necessary to further
the analysis.
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

De Canas,424US at 352-53.
Id at 356-58.
Id at 355.
Hines, 312US at 62.
131SCt 1968(2011).
2007ArizSessLaws1312,codified
atArizRevStatAnn§ 23-211etseq.
, 131S Ctat 1981.
Whiting
Id.
Id at 1979-80.
Id at 1985.
131S Ctat 1985(quotation
marksandcitations
Whiting,
omitted).
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A "fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law."58 Absent clearly expressed intent by Congress, however, state law is not preempted.59 Particularly in areas of traditional state regulation, the
assumption is that a federal statute will not supersede state
law, unless Congress has made such intention clear.60
Indeed, the Supreme Court has maintained a presumption
against preemption when analyzing preemption challenges pertaining to areas of law traditionally occupied by the states, such
as employment relations.61 Such a presumption against preemption would seem to be a necessary corollary to the basic structure of federalism, for it is a mainstay of our federal system of
government that, as James Madison himself observed in Federalist 45, "[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."62
Immigration is not an area traditionally occupied by the
states, of course, but employment relations, health and safety
concerns, and other areas affected by immigration are. The issue, then, is whether the traditional presumption against
preemption should be applied when those areas of traditional
state concern touch on immigration matters.63
The Court's decision in De Canas is instructive on this point.
As noted above, that case involved a group of migrant farm
workers who alleged that certain labor contractors were hiring
undocumented workers in violation of a California statute.64 Respondents challenged the statute on the ground that it amounted to regulation of immigration and was therefore preempted by
federal law. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not preempt
the California statute because the state statute was in harmony
58 Crosby
TradeCouncil
vNationalForeign
, 530US 363,372(2000).
59 See Rice,331US at 230.
60 See id. See alsoMedtronic,
that
Ine v Lohr
, 518US 470,485 (1996)(presuming
in areasoflawwherethe
statelaw,particularly
doesnot"cavalierly"
preempt
Congress
LLC, 544US 431,449(2005)(statBatesvDowAgroSciences
stateshavestrong
authority);
thatdisfavors
hasa dutytoaccepta reading
Court
preemption).
ingthattheSupreme
61 See, forexample,
CoastLineRailroadCo,272 US 605,611
Napierv Atlantic
Radio& MachineWorkers
LocalNo. 1111,UnitedElectrical,
of
(1926);Allen-Bradley
Relations
v Wisconsin
America
Board,315US 740,749(1942).
Employment
62 Federalist
in TheFederalist
45 (Madison),
308,313(citedinnote22).
63 See Rice,331US at 230-31.
64 De Canas, 424US at 353.
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with federal regulation.65 The Court further concluded that respondents failed to identify anything in the plain language of
the INA or its legislative history that warranted the conclusion
that the INA was intended to preempt "harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal
aliens in particular."66 In other words, the Court applied a presumption against preemption even in areas that touch upon
immigration, stating,
[W]e will not presume that Congress, in enacting the INA,
intended to oust state authority to regulate ... in a manner
consistent with pertinent federal laws. Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power - including state
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress would justify that conclusion.67
The Arizona SB 107068 statute that has generated so much
controversy of late is for the most part to the same effect. Arizona did not purport to make any policy over who should be admitted or allowed to stay in this country. Instead, the Arizona law
for the most part expressly followed congressional policy- and
indeed mirrored the provisions of the federal law.69 Arizona's law
incorporates provisions from federal law and promotes compliance with those provisions.70 Subsection (L) of § 2 of the Act specifically provides that the section "shall be implemented in a
manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration,
protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens."71 And the law
expressly provides that its terms "shall be construed to have the
meanings given to them under federal immigration law"72 and
that the "act shall be implemented in a manner consistent with
federal laws regulating immigration."73 Arizona's SB 1070 is
65 De Canas,424US at 357-58n 5.
66 Id at 358.
67 Id at 357(quotation
marksomitted).
68 Support
OurLawEnforcement
andSafeNeighborhoods
Act(SB 1070),2010Ariz
SessLaws113,as amended
byHB 2162,2010ArizSessLaws211.
69 See Plylerv Doe, 457US 202,225(1982)(recognizing
thatstateshaveauthority
toactwithrespect
toillegalalienswhereaction"mirrors
federal
andfurthers
objectives
a legitimate
stategoal").
70 SeeArizRevStatAnn§ 41-1724(B)-(C).
71 ArizRevStatAnn§ 11-1051(L).
72 ArizRevStatAnn§ 41-1724(B).
73 ArizRevStatAnn§ 41-1724(C).
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therefore not a direct regulation of immigration, nor does it conflict with congressional policy, at least for the most part. The
Supreme Court did uphold a preliminary injunction against
three of the roughly twenty substantive sections and subsections
of the Act in Arizona u United States,74 of course, but the remainder of the Act, including the "show me your papers" section,
was allowed to go into effect.75
Arizona
is not alone in seeking to exercise nonnaturalization powers to deal with the consequences of lackluster enforcement of existing federal immigration law. In 2011
alone, state legislators across the nation introduced 1,607 bills
and resolutions relating to immigrants and refugees in all fifty

74 132S Ct2492(2012).
75 Compare
8 USC § 1324(a),withArizRevStatAnn§ 13-1509,
preemption
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states and Puerto Rico.76 This is a significant increase compared
with 2010, when forty-six states considered more than 1,400
bills and resolutions pertaining to immigrants.77 Several states
have introduced legislation that is substantially similar to Arizona's SB 1070.78 Out of these efforts have come new laws in
several states dealing with the collateral effects of illegal immigration. These state enactments enhance enforcement of federal
immigration law in an effortto avoid economic hardship, as well
as to ensure safe living and work environments for all residents.
In 2007, New Jersey enacted Directive 2007-3, 79which provides guidelines establishing the manner in which local, county,
and state law enforcement agencies interact with federal immigration authorities.80 The Directive states that "[s]tate, county,
and local law enforcement agencies necessarily and appropriately should inquire about a person's immigration status," specifically when a person has been arrested for a serious violation of
state criminal law.81
Rhode Island enacted Executive Order 08-0 182 (Illegal Immigration Control Order) in 2008. The Order states:
WHEREAS, Congress and the President have been unable
to resolve the problem of illegal immigration, leaving the
states to deal with the consequences of 11 to 20 million illegal immigrants residing in the United States ... it is urged
that all law enforcement officials, including state and local

76 See NationalConference
ofStateLegislatures,
2011
Immigration
PolicyProject:
Laws and Resolutions
in theStates(2011),onlineat http://www
Immigration-Related
.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.as
(visitedMar3,2013).
77 See id.
78 See, forexample,Beason-Hammon
AlabamaTaxpayerand CitizenProtection
Act(HB 56),2011Ala Laws535,codified
at Ala Code§ 31-13-1
et seq;IllegalImmigrationReform
andEnforcement
Actof2011(HB 87), 151stGa GeneralAssembly
(2011);
SB 590,117thIndGeneralAssembly
Office
oftheAttorney
(2011);StateofNewJersey
General
LawEnforcement
Directive
No 2007-3(Aug22,2007);Support
General,
Attorney
OurLaw Enforcement
andSafeNeighborhoods
Act(HB 4305),96thMichLegis(2011);
OurLawEnforcement
andSafeNeighborhoods
Act(HF 3830),86thMinnLegis
Support
Executive
Order08-01:Illegal
(2010);StateofRhodeIslandandProvidence
Plantations,
Control
Order(Mar27,2008);SouthCarolinaIllegalImmigration
Reform
Immigration
Act(HB 4400),2008SC Acts& Resol280;UtahIllegalImmigration
Enforcement
Act
(HB 116,HB 466,HB 469,andHB 497),59thUtahStateLegis(2011).
79 StateofNewJersey
Office
oftheAttorney
General
Law EnGeneral,
Attorney
Directive
No2007-3(Aug22,2007)("NJAGDirective
No2007-3").
forcement
80 NJAGDirective
No2007-3at 1.
81 NJAGDirective
No2007-3at 1.
82 StateofRhodeIslandandProvidence
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Order08-01:Illegal
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Control
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Immigration
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law enforcement agencies take steps to support the enforcement of federal immigration laws by investigating and
determining the immigration status of all non-citizens.83
Rhode Island found it necessary to enact this Order because "the
presence of significant numbers of people illegally residing in
the state of Rhode Island creates a burden on the resources of
state and local human services, law enforcement agencies, educational institutions and other governmental institutions," as
well as diminishes opportunities for citizens and legal immigrants of Rhode Island.84 Additionally, Rhode Island's Order specifically states that nothing in the Order "shall be construed to
supersede, contravene or conflict with any federal or state law or
regulation" and that state and local law enforcement agencies
are "urged . . . [to] take steps to support the enforcement of federal immigration laws."86
South Carolina's HB 440086 (South Carolina Illegal Immigration Reform Act) requires employers doing business in South
Carolina to either participate in the federal E-Verify program, or
only hire employees who possess or qualify for a South Carolina
driver's license (or another state license with similar requirements).87 This legislation protects those who are not legal residents of the state from the potential of abuse from employers
who may wish to hire them at low wages or force them to work
in unsafe and unhealthy conditions.88
In Michigan, lack of immigration enforcement led to a drain
on the state's economy, causing one of the nation's highest unemployment rates and an exodus of its own residents. This
prompted Michigan to introduce the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,89which requires government
agencies to verify the immigration status of people eighteen
years old or older who apply for federal, state, or local public
benefits.90 The Act specifically states that "the provisions of this
[A]ct shall be implemented in a manner consistent with federal
laws regulating immigration while protecting the civil rights of
S3
84
85
se
87
88
89
90

RI EO 08-01at 1,3.
RI EO 08-01at 1.
RI EO 08-01at 3.
2008SC Acts& Resol280.
SC CodeAnn§ 41-8-20(B)(l)-(2).
SC CodeAnn§ 41-8-20(B)(l)-(2).
HB 4305,96thMichLegis(2011).
HB 4305§3, 96thMichLegis(2011).
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all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of
United States citizens."91 Additionally, the Act makes clear that
no agency or political subdivision of the state of Michigan is allowed to adopt a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of
federal immigrations laws.92
In order to deal with the strain on its economy, Alabama introduced HB 5693 (Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act). This legislation requires police to check the
status of anyone they suspect may be in the country illegally
when they are stopped for another reason.94 It also makes it a
criminal offense to provide transportation or housing to anyone
not legally in the United States95 and enforces penalties on any
business that knowingly employs any person who is in the country unlawfully.96 Perhaps most significantly, it requires school
districts to gather data about the number of illegal immigrant
children who were attending the public schools of the state.97
Alabama's decision to introduce this legislation was based
on the economic hardship due to costs incurred by school districts for public elementary and secondary education of children
who are "aliens not lawfully present in the United States."98 The
drain on Alabama's educational funding was adversely affecting
the availability of public education resources to students who
are US citizens or who are aliens that are lawfully present in
the United States.99 Alabama determined that there was a
"compelling need" for the State Board of Education to accurately
measure and assess the population of students that are aliens
unlawfully present in the United States.100 This measure of the
population was not instituted as a way to deport those who are
unlawfully present or exclude them from public education. Rather, it allows the state to forecast and plan for any impact that
the presence of such a population may have on publicly funded
education. Furthermore, Alabama enacted this legislation in an
91 HB 4305§ 2,96thMichLegis(2011).
92 HB 4305§ 4(1),96thMichLegis(2011).
93 Beason-Hammon
AlabamaTaxpayer
and CitizenProtection
Act(HB 56),2011
AlaLegis535,codified
at AlaCode§31-13-1
etseq.
94 AlaCode§ 31-13-12(a).
95 AlaCode§ 31-13-13.
96 AlaCode§ 31-13-15(a).
97 AlaCode§ 31-13-27.
98 AlaCode§ 31-13-2.
99 AlaCode« 31-13-2.
100AlaCode§ 31-13-2.
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effortto fully comply with federal law.101Alabama found that certain practices previously allowed were actually impeding the enforcement of federal immigration law. Therefore, Alabama adopted the Act to require all agencies within the state to fully
cooperate with federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.102
Minnesota's HF 3830103 (Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act) was introduced in response to the
state's finding that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout Minnesota.104 The provisions of the Act are intended to work together
"to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the
United States."105
Utah's HB 497106 addresses law enforcement, REAL ID (a
program that sets forth the requirements necessary for a state
driver's license or ID card to be accepted by the federal government for official purposes, as defined by the Secretary of Homeland Security), and public benefits.107The legislation requires the
verification of immigration status regarding application for public
services or benefits provided by a state or local governmental
"
agency or subcontractor, except as exempted by federal law ."108
Indiana's SB 590109 establishes state crimes for the possession of false identification, identity fraud, and the transport or
harboring of those unlawfully in the state.110Additionally, state
agencies, political subdivisions, and contractors with public contracts for services with the state or political subdivision are required to use E-Verify (an Internet-based, free program run by
the US government that compares information from an employee's Employment Eligibility Verification Form 1-9 to data from
US government records).111 State agencies and localities must

101AlaCode§ 31-13-2.
102AlaCode§ 31-13-2.
103HF 3830,86thMinnLegis(2010).
104HF 3830§ 2,86thMinnLegis(2010).
105HF 3830§ 2,86thMinnLegis(2010).
106HB 497,59thUtahStateLegis(2011).
107HB 497§§ 4-8,59thUtahStateLegis(2011).
108HB497at2,59thUtahStateLegis(2011)(emphasis
added)(highlighted
provisions).
109SB 590,117thIndGeneral
(2011).
Assembly
110SB 590SS 19,23-24,117thIndGeneral
Assembly
(2011).
111SB 590§ 17,117thIndGeneral
(2011).
Assembly
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verify eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits, and unemployment compensation.112
And Georgia's HB 87113 (Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Act of 2011) requires employers with more than four workers to verify the immigration status of new hires using the federal E-Verify database.114
Each state has enacted legislation that is completely consistent with federal law and has done so based on legitimately
serious concerns over the consequences of nonenforcement of
federal immigration policies. These concerns implicate police
powers, not naturalization powers. Thus, while all of these state
laws touch on immigration, under the line of demarcation set
out in De Canas, most of the provisions should be constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona has now
blurred that line, however.
The seeds for the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona were
sown in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the case. That opinion
was, as I have noted elsewhere, based on a glaring and broad
conceptual error about the import of the distinction between police powers, which are reserved to the states, and naturalization
powers, which are not.115The Ninth Circuit panel noted early in
the opinion, for example, that "Congress has instructed under
what conditions state officials are permitted to assist the Executive in the enforcement of immigration laws."116 Later, it held
that "Subsection (g)(10) [of 8 USC § 1357] does not operate as a
broad alternative grant of authority for state officers to systematically enforce the INA outside of the restrictions set forth in
subsections (g)(l)-(9)."117 And it contended that its restrictive interpretation of the derivation of state authority is bolstered by
8 USC § 1103(a)(10), which authorizes the attorney general to
deputize state and local law enforcement officers "[i]n the event
the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent
mass influx of aliens arriving offthe coast of the United States, or
near a land border, presents urgent circumstances requiring an
immediate Federal response."118 "If subsection (g)(10) meant that
state and local officers could routinely perform the functions of
112SB 590§ 15,117thIndGeneral
(2011).
Assembly
113HB 87,151stGa General
Assembly
(2011).
114HB 87§§ 2, 12,151stGa General
Assembly
(2011).
115See Eastman,
35HarvJL & PubPolat 585-86(citedinnote75).
116United
StatesvArizona
, 641F3d339,348(9thCir2011).
117Id at 349.
118Id at 350n 9,citing
INA§ 103(a)(10),
8 USC § 1103(a)(10).
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DHS officersoutside the supervision of the Attorney General," the
court asserted, "there would be no need for Congress to give the
Attorney General the ability, in § 1103(a)(10), to declare an actual
or imminent mass influx of aliens, and to authorize any State or
local law enforcement officer to perform the functions of a DHS
officer."119
These statements reveal a fundamental conceptual misunderstanding of federalism. States do not derive their authority to
act from the federal Constitution, nor do they require the approval of federal officials or an Act of Congress to exercise police
powers in their own states. The federal Constitution serves only
to limit state authority where specified.120Conversely, the federal government both derives its authority from the federal Constitution and is limited by it. It is no surprise, then, that in each
of the statutes that the Ninth Circuit cited dealing with federalstate enforcement cooperation, authorization is given to federal
officials to enter into such agreements.121 No such authorization
is given to the states, because none is needed. Indeed, quite the
opposite is true. For example, as INA § 103(a)(10) makes clear,
the Attorney General's ability to enlist officials in federal enforcement effortsis contingent on "the consent of the head of the
department, agency, or establishment under whose jurisdiction
the individual is serving."122To hold otherwise, as the Ninth Circuit did, is to answer the question left open by the Supreme
Court in Hines in the negative and to repudiate the Supreme
Court's holding in De Canas.
While not as stark, the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona
also rested on that fundamental error.123Nevertheless, by upholding § 2(B) of the Arizona statute, and leaving in place the
lower court's decision not to enjoin the bulk of the statute, much
of the principled line drawn in De Canas remains intact. Many
of the state statutes referenced above should therefore survive
constitutional challenge.

119Arizona
marksomitted).
, 641F3dat 350n 9 (quotation
120Asoriginally
areinAronstateauthority
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121See INA§ 103(a)(10),
8 USC § 1357(g)(1).
INA§ 287(g)(1),
8 USC § 1103(a)(10);
122INA§ 103(a)(10),
8 USC § 1103(a)(10).
123Arizona
, 132S Ctat 2506.
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Gloss

Let me turn now to the issues that flow from the constitutional separation of powers between the branches of the federal
government, first regarding the role of the executive and ultimately regarding the role of the judiciary as part of the whole
institutional design that was the subject of the symposium at
which this Article was presented.
A.

The Role of the President

If one accepts the historically recognized proposition that
the Constitution vests plenary power to set immigration and
naturalization policy in the Congress and the further De Canas
proposition that, while the states may not be able to exercise
naturalization powers, they do have significant authority to exercise their police powers even in areas that touch upon immigration, then the basic premise advanced by the Department of
Justice in the Arizona litigation is rather startling. That premise was essentially that, despite existing federal immigration
laws on the books, a unilateral determination by the president
not to enforce those laws preempts any state efforts to augment
enforcement if they deem such efforts helpful in the exercise of
their police powers. Happily, the Supreme Court's reasoning in
the case did not embrace that proposition.
The president has the same discretion in enforcing the provisions of the INA as he does with enforcing other federal statutes, of course. But the contention that such discretion permits
the president to override state laws that are consistent with a
policy set down by Congress is a rather broad expansion of prosecutorial discretion (albeit one hinted at by Justice Antonin
Scalia in Printz v United States124).
Such a claim seems inconsistent with the statutory scheme
actually adopted by Congress, and it therefore undermines the
124521US 898,922-23(1997):
TheConstitution
doesnotleaveto speculation
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thelaws
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long-standing position that power to set naturalization and immigration policy is a plenary power of Congress. The statutory
provisions acknowledge important roles for state and local officials to play in the enforcement of federal immigration law. The
Attorney General is to communicate with state officials regarding the immigration status of individuals, for example, even if
there is no agreement with the federal government for a formal
cooperative enforcement program.125Additionally, Congress imposed a duty on federal immigration officials to "respond to an
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking
to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of
any individual."126 If Congress wanted to give federal immigration officers discretion as to whether to answer state and local
citizenship inquiries, it could have used the word "may" instead
of "shall" in § 1373(c).
Indeed, Congress's requirement that the federal government
respond to state and local inquiries into immigration status quite
clearly indicates that states are free to "cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of [illegal] aliens."127 It is thus clear from the text of
§ 1373(c) that Congress wanted states to help enforce its immigration policy, and it is for this reason that the Supreme Court did
not uphold the injunction against § 2(b) of the Arizona statute.128
A claim of extensive executive power or "global" enforcement
discretion in the immigration arena that is contrary to the expressed policy of Congress is unsupported by Supreme Court
precedent that has recognized executive branch prosecutorial
discretion. Rather, the discretion that has been afforded to the
executive itself derives from acts of Congress.129 There is thus no
basis for the claim that the president has the power to pursue a
comprehensive and sweeping immigration scheme that runs
counter to the statutory provisions already created by Congress.
Although Congress has indeed vested the executive branch with
125INA§ 287(e)(10)(A),
8 USC S 1357(g)(10)(A).
1268 USC § 1373(c).
127INA§ 287(g)(10(B),
8 USC § 1357(g)(10)(B).
128SeeArizona,
132S Ctat 2508.
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526US
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a considerable degree of discretion for purposes of enforcing the
INA, this discretion has historically been limited to individual
remedies in particular cases.130 Executive discretion simply is
not sufficient for the president to override state laws that are
consistent with the expressed policy of Congress. As Justice
Samuel Alito recognized in his concurring opinion in the Arizona
case, "The United States' argument that § 2(B) [of the Arizona
statute] is pre-empted, not by any federal statute or regulation,
but simply by the Executive's current enforcement policy is an
astounding assertion of federal executive power that the Court
rightly rejects."131
In the Arizona litigation, the Department of Justice also relied
on the president's foreign policy powers in addition to his prosecutorial powers. It contended that the president's policy of nonenforcement was permitted by the president's powers in the realm of
foreign affairs, and that any attempt by any state to assist in the
enforcement of immigration statutes adopted by Congress would
interfere with those powers and necessitate preemption.132
Although the Department's premise was correct- the president is the nation's chief organ in the field of foreign affairs133
the superstructure it attempted to erect on that premise would
have pushed the authority well beyond the breaking point.
The president can of course negotiate a treaty that touches
on a policy such as immigration, and once ratified by the Senate,
that treaty has the force of law.134 However, until this happens,
an un-ratified treaty does not preempt state law. Necessarily,
then, informal diplomatic discussions cannot do so. Moreover,
even a ratified treaty must give way to a subsequent act of Congress in an area within the legislative authority of Congress,
particularly Congress's plenary power over immigration.136
Medellin v Texas 136is on point. There, the President sought
to transform international obligations under a non-selfexecuting treaty into binding federal law that was operative
130See,forexample,
338US at 540;Aguirre526US at 431;INS v
Knauff,
Aguirre,
Chadha, 462US 919,923(1983).
131Arizona
, 132S Ctat 2524(Alitoconcurring).
132See BrieffortheUnitedStates,Arizonav United
States
*13-14(US
, No 11-182,
filedMar19,2012)(availableonWestlaw
at 2012WL939048).
133See United
Statesv Curtiss-Wright
, 299US 304,319(1936).
Export
Corp
134US ConstArtVI,cl 2 (declaring
thattreaties
madeunderthe"[a]uthority
ofthe
UnitedStates"arethesupreme
lawoftheland).
135See ChaeChanPingv United
States,130US 581,600(1889).
136552US 491(2008).
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against the states, without an act of Congress. Although the Supreme Court recognized that the president has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, it held the ability to unilaterally convert a non-selfexecuting treaty into a self-executing one is not among them.
The responsibility for "transforming an international obligation
arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls
to Congress."137 The Court emphasized that the president's authorization to represent the United States in an international
context speaks only to his international responsibilities - it does
not grant him the unilateral authority to create domestic law.138
What the Court held in Medellin was even truer in the Arizona case because the United States in that case was not relying
on any treaty, but merely on a theory of the president's amorphous authority over foreign affairs and diplomacy. As Medellin
makes clear, more than simply the president's say-so would be
required if such an interest could ever be sufficient to negate a
state's attempt to assist with the enforcement of immigration
laws that have been duly enacted by Congress.
Without the more formal process for creating domestic law
that Medellin requires, state judges and officials must enforce
federal law as it is written, and not as the president would like
it to be, a point made explicit by Article VI of the Constitution.139
Arizona had simply authorized its own officials to assist in that
effort.Because that vindicates rather than undermines the policy determinations made by Congress, despite an apparently different set of policy determinations emanating from the Executive branch, the institutional design we have, which assigns
plenary power in this area to Congress, could not countenance
that aspect of the president's claims.
B.

The Role of the Supreme Court

Finally, we turn to the tantalizing question suggested by the
title of this Article. If we accept the premise that Congress has
plenary power in this area, the adjudicative function of the courts
must further, rather than undermine, the policy judgments made
137Id at 525-26.
13®
Id at 529-30.
139US ConstArtVI,cl 2 (mandating
ineveryStateshallbe bound"
that"theJudges
oftheUnitedStates);US ConstArtVI,cl 3 (prolaws,andtreaties
bytheConstitution,
... oftheseveralStates,shallbeboundbyOathor
that"allexecutive
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by Congress, to the extent permitted by other provisions of the
Constitution. So just what is the role of the courts in the institutional design, and have they performed that role properly?
In addressing that question, I want to focus on what I consider to be the three principal magnets for illegal immigration,
which is to say, the three principal challenges to implementation
of the policy decisions that Congress has made: (1) better employment prospects in the United States than exist in the illegal
immigrant's country of origin; (2) access to better social welfare
benefits (education, health care, infrastructure, poverty-support
programs, and so forth); and (3) citizenship for the illegal immigrant's children and, perhaps, for the illegal immigrant himself.
And here, I'd like to advance the proposition that the Supreme Court's decisions in all three areas have enhanced the
magnetic attraction for illegal immigration and have thereby
undermined congressional policy choices. If those decisions are
truly compelled by the Constitution, then the impediment is one
with which Congress simply must live. But if they misconstrue
the Constitution's limits on congressional power, they needlessly
thwart Congress's efforts,resulting in institutional conflict that
flows from advancing contradictory policy goals. Although I
think the employment magnet may provide the strongest attraction for illegal immigration, I'd like to start with the social welfare magnet because I think the Court's major decision on that
issue most clearly demonstrates the Court's erroneous constitutional premise.
The leading Supreme Court case addressing restrictions on
delivery of government services to illegal immigrants, of course, is
Ply 1er v Doe,140in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a Texas statute withholding state funding from local school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the
United States and authorizing local school districts to deny enrollment to such children.141A decade and a half after the decision, Congress expressly sought to counteract the holding in the
case, adopting in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996142that it was the official immigration policy of the United States that "the availability of public
benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United
States" and that there is "a compelling government interest to
14°457US 202(1982).
141Id at 205.
142PubL No 104-193,
110Stat2105.
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remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the
availability of public benefits."143But the error in Plyler precedes
this explicit statement of congressional policy to the contrary, and
here, finally, we get to the Corfield u Coryell144analogy and the
sub silentio rejection of Corfield by both the Supreme Court in
Plyler and the modern internationalists discussed at the outset of
this Article who would eliminate national borders altogether.
Granted, Corfield is a Privileges and Immunities Clause
case, while Plyler is an Equal Protection case,145but the claim by
citizens for access to another state's resources that was rejected
in Corfield should be stronger, not weaker, than the claim by illegal immigrants for access to a state's resources that was accepted in Plyler. The Privileges and Immunities Clause must
provide something more to "citizens" than the Equal Protection
Clause provides to all "persons," citizen and non-citizen alike,
lest the Privileges and Immunities Clause - actually, both
Clauses, that of Article IV and that of § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment - be rendered entirely superfluous.
Corfield involved a claim by a citizen from another state
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,146which
requires each state to afford to citizens of other states the same
privileges and immunities as it affords to its own citizens, entitled him to fish for oysters in the waters of New Jersey despite
state law limiting such activity to the citizens of New Jersey.147
Justice Bushrod Washington rejected the claim, noting that the
court could not
accede to the proposition . . . that, under [the Privileges and
Immunities Clause], the citizens of the several states are
permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely
upon the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens;
much less, that in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of such state, the legislature is bound to

1438 USC § 1601(2)(B),
(6).
1446 F Cases546(CC ED Pa 1823).
145It shouldalsobe notedthatPlyleris a decision
CourtwhileCoroftheSupreme
But
circuit.
whileriding
CourtJustice
rendered
a decision
bya Supreme
fieldis merely
ofthe
thedebatesovertheadoption
during
giventheheavyrelianceplacedon Corfield
orImmunities
Amendment's
Fourteenth
Clause,I thinkit fairtoelevatethe
Privileges
discussion.
ofthepresent
forpurposes
case'sstanding
146US ConstArtIV,§ 2,cl 1.
147Corfield,
6 F Casesat 550.

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Thu, 13 Nov 2014 19:27:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

192

The Universityof Chicago Law Review

[80:165

extend to the citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own citizens.148
The citizens of New Jersey, Justice Washington further explained, "may be considered as tenants in common of this property; and they are so exclusively entitled to the use of it, that it
cannot be enjoyed by others without the tacit consent, or the express permission of the sovereign who has the power to regulate
its use."149
What was true of oysters in New Jersey is at least equally
true of the public resources at issue in Plyler. Those public resources were owned by the citizens and lawful residents of Texas
as something like tenants in common, who were thereby exclusively entitled to their use. The enjoyment of those public resources by others, therefore, could be had only with the tacit
consent, or the express permission, of the sovereign. As the Texas law at issue in Plyler made clear, no such consent was forthcoming. The outcome in Plyler should therefore have been the
same as the outcome in Corfield. Just as it was not a denial of
the privileges and immunities of citizens from neighboring
states not to be able to take New Jersey's oysters, and just as it
would not be a denial of the privileges and immunities of citizens from neighboring states if Texas chose not to provide free
public education to residents just across the Texas border in
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, or New Mexico were they to
seek to come daily to Texas to avail themselves of the Texas education system, neither should the Court in Plyler have held
that those from foreign nations who were unlawfully present in
Texas had an equal protection entitlement to a share of the
common property of the lawful citizens and residents of that
state.
Justice William Brennan, who wrote the opinion for the
Court in Plyler, noted that "few if any illegal immigrants come
to this country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to
avail themselves of a free education."150 But the holding in the
case turned what may at the time have been a relatively incidental benefit into one of the three great magnets for illegal
immigration. Since that decision, the rationale of the holding
has been extended to medical services, housing, and other forms
148Id at 552.
149Id.
150Plyler,
457US at 228.
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of public assistance.151 The magnet thereby created by the Court
in Plyler runs at cross-purposes with the immigration policies
set by Congress.
A similar analysis can be applied to some court decisions in
the employment context. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Sure-Tan, lne v NLRB ,152a "primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers."153While the
job market is not as clearly a public good as, say, oysters in New
Jersey or free public education in Texas, there is certainly a
sense in which the legal institutions of this nation provide, at
some significant cost to the taxpayers, the rule-of-law climate
that fosters a favorable economy and job market. Judicial decisions that encourage participation in that market by those who
are not authorized by Congress to be legally employed in this
country, therefore, also run at cross-purposes to congressional
immigration and naturalization policy. Indeed, "it is impossible
for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United
States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies."154
The prime example is the judicial developments that have
occurred in the wake of Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, lne v NLRB ,155 In Sure-Tan, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that it was an unfair labor
practice, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act,156for
an employer to notify federal immigration officials of the undocumented statuses of his employees, "solely because the employees supported the Union."157 But she specifically acknowledged
that the employer knew of the employees' illegal status before
the union organizing activities,158and also that federal immigration law at the time did not make it illegal for employers to employ illegal immigrants or for illegal immigrants to accept employment.159Those important caveats have not proved to limit
the reach of the decision, however. Nor has the Supreme Court's
151See Lewisv Grinker,
thedeci794F Supp1193,1203-04(EDNY 1991)(invoking
ofaliensviolatedthe
sionin Plylerin holding
thatdenialofprenatalcareto children
Clause).
EqualProtection
152467US 883(1984).
153Id at 893.
154Hoffman
PlasticCompounds,
InevNLRB,535US 137,148(2002).
155535US 137(2002).
156PubL No74-198,
at 29 USC § 151etseq.
ch372,49 Stat449(1935),codified
157Sure-Tan,
467US at 888,894-95.
158Id at 887.
159Id at 892-93.See alsoINA§ 101etseq,8 USC § 1101etseq.
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subsequent ruling in Hoffman Plastics, holding that those who
are ineligible for employment because of their undocumented
status are not entitled to back pay following a successful unfair
labor practices claim.160
Shortly after Hoffman Plastics, for example, the Ninth Circuit considered, in Rivera v NIBCO, Ine,161an employer's challenge to a protective order forbidding discovery about immigration status.162 The case involved alleged national origin
discrimination in violation of Title VII; the employer had given a
basic job skills examination in English. Despite the fact that
plaintiffs' requested relief included back pay, relief that would
be foreclosed for any plaintiff who was unlawfully present in the
United States, the Ninth Circuit upheld the protective order,
finding that such discovery would have a chilling effect even on
documented workers.163
Similarly, in the 2006 case of EEOC v Restaurant Co,164the
District Court for Minnesota denied an employer's motion to
compel discovery about the immigration status of a former employee who had filed a Title VII complaint for sexual harassment
and retaliation.165 The record reflected that whatever sexual
harassment there may have been was committed by the employee's supervisor without knowledge or sanction by the employer,
and that the employer immediately undertook to investigate the
charges, likely rendering the harassment charge against the
company itself unlikely of success.166 But the retaliation claim
was another matter. The record reflects that during the course
of the investigation, the employee revealed to the employer that
she had not complained previously of the harassing conduct because she was unlawfully present in the country and therefore
feared deportation.167 Because continued employment of such an
individual would have been a criminal offense by the employer
at the time the events occurred (unlike in 1984, when Sure-Tan
was decided), the employer advised the employee that federal

160Hoffman,
535US at 149.
161364F3d1057(9thCir2004).
162Id at 1061.
163Id at 1065.
164448F Supp2d 1085(D Minn2006).
165Id at 1088.
166EEOC vRestaurant
Co,490F Supp2d 1039,1044-45(D Minn2007).
167Id at 1045.
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law required it to have valid 1-9 forms on each employee,168and
asked her to complete a new one. She never returned to work,
claiming instead that the 1-9 request was a constructive discharge and therefore unlawful retaliation. The EEOC, which
was pursuing the claim on behalf of the employee, opposed the
employer's discovery request on the ground that it was unduly
burdensome, and the District Court rejected the employer's motion to compel.169
As a consequence of these rulings, employers can be held liable for retaliation merely for seeking to ascertain the lawful
immigration status of their employees, thereby insulating illegal
immigrant employees from such inquiries. The employment
magnet for illegal immigration thus grows stronger.
Finally, there is the issue of birthright citizenship, the third
most important magnet for current illegal immigration. Although the common understanding is that mere birth on US soil is
sufficient to gain US citizenship, the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment actually contains two requirements: "All persons
born ... in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."170 Modern parlance interprets the phrase, "subject to the jurisdiction," to mean simply subject to our laws, rendering it almost entirely redundant to the first phrase. The
debates in Congress during the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggest a different interpretation, however, one
that distinguishes between mere territorial jurisdiction and a
broader, more complete, allegiance-owing jurisdiction.171 Think
of it this way: A foreign tourist visiting the United States subjects himself to the laws of the United States while here. An
Englishman must drive on the right side of the road rather than
the left, for example, when visiting here. But he cannot be prosecuted for treason if he takes up arms against the United States
because he owes no allegiance to the United States. He is subject
to the partial, territorial jurisdiction while here but not to the
broader jurisdiction that would follow him beyond the borders.
168See INA § 274A(b),8 USC § 1324a(b).See also INA § 274A(a)(2),8 USC
of
an employee
mustdischarge
thatan employer
upondiscovery
§ 1324a(a)(2)(stating
civ8 USC § 1324a(e)(4)(A)
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(establishing
status);INA§ 274A(e)(4)(A),
8 USC § 1324a(f)(l)(esINA§ 274A(f)(l),
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The issue whether the children of illegal immigrants are
"subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States in the way intended by this language has never been definitively addressed
by the Supreme Court. That is, there is no holding to that effect
by the Supreme Court, only dicta in three cases: United States v
174
Wong Kim Ark,172INS v Rios-Pineda ,173and Ply 1er. In Wong
Kim Ark the Court held that the children of lawful, permanent
residents were automatic citizens by virtue of their birth,175but
it had previously held in Elk v Wilkins,176a decision left in place
by Wong Kim Ark, that the children of Native Americans were
not automatic citizens by birth because, owing primary allegiance to their tribe, a separate sovereign, they were not subject
to the full and complete jurisdiction of the United States.177
So what exactly does the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mean? As I have argued elsewhere, I think
the legislative history is more consistent with the view that in
adopting the Citizenship Clause, as with its predecessor in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 178Congress did not intend to provide for
a broad and absolute birthright citizenship.179 The 1866 Act provides, "All persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."180 As this formulation
makes clear, any child born on US soil to parents who were temporary visitors to this country and who, as a result of the foreign
citizenship of the child's parents, remained a citizen or subject of
the parents' home country, was not entitled to claim the birthright citizenship provided in the 1866 Act. That was the view
first espoused by the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, in the
Slaughter-House Cases;181 it was the view espoused by the Court,
this time as a holding, in Elk ;182and it was the view articulated

172169US 649,693(1898).
173471US 444,450(1985).
174Plyler,
457US at 215.
175Wong
KimArk, 169US at 705.
176112US 94 (1884).
177Id at 118-19.
178Ch31,14Stat27,codified
as amended
invarioussections
ofTitle42.
179See,forexample,
JohnC. Eastman,Bornin theU.S.A.?Rethinking
Birthright
intheWakeof9/11,12TexRevL & Polit167,170-74(2007).
Citizenship
180CivilRights
Actof1866§ 1,ch31,14Statat 27.
18183US (16Wall)36,91 (1873).
182Elk,112US at 101-02.
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by the most prominent constitutional commentator of the era,
Thomas Cooley.183
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's holding in Wong Kim
Ark, or more precisely the expansive gloss that has subsequently
been given to that holding, established the magnet of birthright
citizenship that also serves to undermine congressional immigration policy. Moreover, Justice Horace Gray's position for the
Court in that case is simply at odds with the notion of consent
that underlay the sovereign's power over naturalization. What it
meant, fundamentally, was that foreign nationals could secure
American citizenship for their children unilaterally, merely by
giving birth on American soil, whether their arrival on America's shores was legal or illegal, temporary or permanent.
In dicta, Justice Gray contended that the children of two
classes of foreigners were not entitled to the birthright citizenship he thought guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment:
first, the children of ambassadors and other foreign diplomats
who, as the result of the fiction of extraterritoriality, were not
even considered subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States; and second, the children of invading armies born
on US soil while it was occupied by the foreign army.184 But
apart from that, all children of foreign nationals who managed
to be born on US soil were, in his formulation, citizens of the
United States. Children born of parents who had been offered
permanent residence but were not yet citizens and who, as a result, had not yet renounced allegiance to their prior sovereign
would become citizens by birth on US soil. This was true even if,
as was the case in Wong Kim Ark itself, the parents were, by
treaty, unable ever to become citizens. This was the extent of the
actual holding of the case.185
The dictum was much broader, of course. Children of parents
residing only temporarily in the United States on a work or student visa would also become US citizens if the dictum were to become binding precedent. Children of parents who had overstayed
their temporary visa would also become US citizens, even though
born of parents who were now here illegally. And, perhaps most
183See Thomas
LawintheUnitTheGeneral
M. Cooley,
ofConstitutional
Principles
tothejurisdicBrown3ded 1898)(noting
270(Little,
ed StatesofAmerica
that,"subject
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troubling from the consent rationale, children of parents who
never were in the United States legally would also become citizens as the direct result of the illegal action by their parents. This
would be true even if the parents were nationals of a regime at
war with the United States and even if the parents were here to
commit acts of sabotage against the United States, at least so
long as the sabotage did not actually involve occupying a portion
of the territory of the United States.186 The notion that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, when seeking to guarantee
the right of citizenship to former slaves, also sought to guarantee citizenship to the children of enemies of the United States
who were in our territory illegally is simply too absurd to be a
credible interpretation of the Citizenship Clause.
This is not to say that Congress could not, pursuant to its
naturalization power, choose to grant citizenship to the children
of foreign nationals. But thus far it has not done so. Instead, the
language of the current naturalization statute simply tracks the
minimum constitutional guarantee - anyone born in the United
States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is a citizen.187Understanding that constitutional phrase is therefore as necessary now as it
was in 1884 and 1898.
By effectively writing that clause out of the Constitution,
beyond the actual holding of Wong Kim Ark to the assumptions
in obiter dicta contained in Rios-Pinedaies and Plyler,189 the
Court has given to alien Corfields not just the oysters that the
people of the United States own in common, but the pearl itself,
a share in the sovereignty of another people, without having to
go through the trouble of obtaining consent or otherwise pursuing the path toward legal naturalization. Such a rule undermines
not only the immigration policy choices made by Congress and the
plenary authority given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution
to make them, but the very principle of "consent of the governed"
that lies at the heart of the Declaration of Independence. Only an
unambiguous constitutional text should compel such a result. Given that the ratification history of the Citizenship Clause is at least
open to, and in my view leans heavily toward, the meaning that
"subject to the jurisdiction" was not synonymous with "born in the
United States" - that it meant subject to the complete, rather than
186Id at 693.
187INA§ 301(a),8 USC § 1401(a).
lao mos-ťineaa,
471US at 446.
1BaPlyler,
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merely partial or territorial, jurisdiction - that standard has not
been met.
Conclusion
In sum, recent judicial decisions dealing with benefits, employment, and even citizenship itself have strengthened the
magnetic lure of illegal immigration. This has undermined the
policy choices made by Congress and, effectively, treated the resources, opportunities, and sovereignty of this nation not as the
common property of the people of the United States, but as fair
game for anyone the world over who can cross our borders and
stake their claim. Justice Washington's reasoning in Corfield
needs a revival!
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